In philosophy, the ‘mind-body problem’ pertains to the branch of metaphysics and philosophy of the mind. It evaluates the relationship and interactions between consciousness and the physical world — particularly, the brain. Over time, various philosophers have postulated the possible theories regarding the nature of the brain and whether it is inherently interconnected with a ‘psyche’ or consciousness. This has led to a plethora of views, two in particular being materialism and dualism. Materialism asserts that matter is the only thing that exists and emphasises that the brain — and therefore, the physical world — is the sole component of our existence. Contrarily, dualism asserts that there is a consciousness or a non-material component that interacts with the physical world to form life as we know it. Thomas Nagel is a philosopher that takes on an interesting approach to the mind-body problem by evaluating the nature of consciousness. By doing so, he simultaneously questions the degree to which we can solve the problem at all given our lack of knowledge about its abstract nature. He defines consciousness as ‘something it is like to be that organism’, which is derived from a particular organism’s point of view. He calls this the subjective character of experience. He uses this definition in his theory to evaluate the nature of consciousness and argue that we are lacking the empirical knowledge to constructively conclude on the existence of consciousness and, hence, the mind-body problem. Through this essay, I aim to critically evaluate Nagel’s theory to analyse his view on the mind-body problem. Moreover, I aim to use his theory to evaluate whether or not we can truly know the nature of consciousness with the information we have present in our current age.
To begin with, it is essential to note how Nagel differentiates between subjective and objective knowledge for the purpose of this essay. He states that subjective knowledge is the information available to an organism based on their type of point of view; for instance, humans and bats are both mammals, yet each have their own respective perceptions of the world which are different based on their physical composition as well as prospective consciousness. Humans have five primary senses that make up our perceptual status — namely visual, gustatory, tactile, auditory, and olfactory senses. This plays a fundamental role in how we perceive the world, and therefore, our consciousness. Contrarily, bats produce echolocation by emitting sound waves at extremely high frequencies, known as ultrasound1. They use this ability for fundamental aspects of their life, such as hunting and navigating. This is called the subjective character of experience: an organism’s individual perception of the world which is exclusive to that organism alone. This sense of exclusivity, or the subjective character of experience, limits humans from perceiving the world the way bats do.
One may object to this by stating that we may be able to theoretically hypothesize what it is like to be a bat through theoretical knowledge, stimulation, or even our imagination. However, Nagel goes on to assert that we cannot truly know what it is like for a bat to be bat since we are limited by our human perceptual apparatus. None of our senses can accurately reproduce what it is like to be a bat since our internal composition is fundamentally different. As Nagel says, “Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited.2” Even our very understanding of echolocation stems from our human senses (through visually reading or observing or hearing about it). This means that at the very maximum, we can imagine what it may be like for us to behave like a bat, yet not what it is truly like for a bat to be a bat. Hence, it is impossible to reproduce a first-person experience to a third person regardless of how detailed the theoretical explanation may be.
Nagel goes on to state that although subjective character of experience may not be transferable between different types of point of views, one may use objective knowledge that is comprehendible from more than one type of view. Here, objective knowledge is information that is statistically and factually known regardless of one’s subjective character of experience. One example is that of lightning: humans experience lightning through the visual impact it has on our senses when we see a flash in the sky. However, hypothetically, an intelligent individual born without sight would also easily be able to comprehend the concept of lightning without ever experiencing its visual impact. The objective reality of lightening is atmospheric electrical discharge — a concept that is comprehendible by any organism with intelligence regardless of their perceptual methods or subjective character of experience. This can be applied to many other scientific facets; for instance, water being broken down to H2O. Therefore, we focus on the objective and scientific nature of the knowledge underlying the subjective appearance of what we experience.
However, Nagel’s official argument states that any objective theory inherently and undoubtedly abandons the original subjective point of view. The initial intention of using an objective theory was to create a better understanding of different types of subjective point of views. However, in doing so, we inevitably abandon the subjective experience altogether causing the effort to be rendered futile. To better understand this concept we can use the previous examples to build on the following analogy: years from now, we encounter an intelligent species of Martians that have a completely different set of perceptive senses as humans. We describe our account of lightning as a flash in the sky; however, they are unable to fully comprehend this since they don’t have the appropriate organs for senses such as vision. We decide to explain the theoretical science behind atmospheric discharge and they associate it with something they know on their own planet as reaction X. Now, they have associated their account of atmospheric discharge (reaction X) with our account of atmospheric discharge (flash in the sky/lightning); however, they still don’t know what it is like for a human to be a human and experience lightning. They still don’t perceive lightning the same way as a human would.
Now as mentioned before, Nagel defines consciousness as ‘something it is like to be that organism’. However, as explained above, is impossible for any organism to know what it is like to be anything other than itself. Therefore, according to Nagel, no scientific account of consciousness is possible with the scientific information we have in the present date.
According to me, Thomas Nagel’s argument is extremely plausible; however, it has one fundamental problem. By creating a strict differentiation between the subjective and objective, Nagel doesn’t consider the possibility that they may be interconnected. This is highlighted by William Lycan3 as he suggests that scientists try to create objective descriptions that include the subjective aspects within them, particularly since subjectivity is essential to experience and perception. Rather than replacing one with the other, they try to create a description that takes into consideration the phenomenon or event as a whole with its objective and subjective aspects in place. This would allow a better understanding of how other organisms’ perceive the world as well as their consciousness; hence, bearing on our overall understanding of the mind-body problem.
However, considering the complicated nature of creating such descriptions, Nagel may be right to assume it is difficult, if not impossible, to form such inclusive descriptions given our current scientific standing on the topic. Even if it is possible, there is no guarantee that it is applicable and accurate for all experiences of all the phenomena across all kinds of organisms with different methods of perceiving the world. Therefore, it is unlikely that consciousness can be scientifically explained with the information we have available currently.
Moreover, another objection is one that can be raised against the entirety of Nagel’s argument considering that it takes a comparative approach to different organisms’ subjective character of experience. Nagel evaluates the mind-body problem by defining consciousness as ‘something it is like to be that organism’; however, this brings forth the external problem of questioning what consciousness is like across various species before even establishing the existence of consciousness. Other philosophers may choose to define consciousness in a manner that suits its abstract nature; for instance, an introspective sense of awareness that brings forth signs of life. This portrays that Nagel’s thought experiment solely relies on one facet of consciousness, yet its abstract nature may evoke various other thought experiments that lead to more constructive conclusions with or without scientific means.
In conclusion, Thomas Nagel uses his definition of conciousness and subjective character of experience to evaluate the mind-body problem — particularly through the example of bats and humans. He goes on to describe objective knowledge as a method to try and gain better understanding of other types of points of view. However, he renders it futile since he says objectivity inevitably abandons the initial subjective point of view that made us want to look at a phenomenon objectively in the first place. Finally, he concludes by stating that it is improbable that today’s scientific knowledge can support answering the mind-body problem. Overall, he presents an extremely compelling and valid argument for the mind-body problem; however, there are valid objections to his arguments that could be solved with further thought experiments and a-posteriori research.
Works Cited
“Echolocation.” National Parks Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, https://www.nps.gov/subjects/bats/echolocation.htm#:~:text=Bats%20navigate%20and%20 find%20insect,off%20objects%20in%20their%20environment.&text=The%20bat%20calls
%20can%20be,humans%20can%20see%20and%20hear.
Rosen, Gideon, et al. The Norton Introduction To Philosophy. Second ed.
Kyra is an aspiring writer, artist, and philosopher. Her creative endeavours have been inspired by an interest in phenomenology, surrealist aesthetics, and unconventional gothic storytelling, deeply reminiscent of the works of Edgar Allen Poe, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.
